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Institutional Conditions of Contemporary Legal Thought 
Paulo Barrozo 
INTRODUCTION: THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS 
Traditions of high thought require a home to thrive. The modes of sustained, 
intergenerational, sufficiently self-referential, and cumulative inquiry that we 
call the high traditions of thought are fragile, collective, transient efforts, 
constantly under threat of collapsing along with the lives of those of the 
latest generation engaged in them. Except when they find good and lasting 
institutional homes. 
The activity of thinking is an existential essential-"[ e ]ven Socrates, so much 
in love with the marketplace, has to go home .. . A life without thinking is quite 
possible; it then fails to develop its own essence - it is not merely meaningless; 
it is not fully alive. Unthinking men are like sleepwalkers" (Arendt 1978: 190-
1) - with important social and cultural preconditions and consequences. One 
important consequence is that the inability to think well lies at the root of the 
most destructive choices and agency, for "knowledge is no guarantee of good 
behavior, but ignorance is a virtual guarantee of bad behavior" (Nussbaum 
2010: 81). Among its preconditions, good thinking requires access to a medium 
between the mind and the outside world able to function as tentative evaluative 
and cognitive lenses. Traditions of thought function as a revisable medium, 
and as a launching platform for thinking. As cognitive lenses, traditions of 
thought may certainly conceal and distort, but good traditions of thought 
reveal more than they hide of the world. As evaluative lenses, traditions of 
thought are implicated in all sorts of unwarranted apologetics. However, good 
traditions of thought provide a vista from which to criticize, reconstruct, and 
point to action in directions that may better self and society. The sociological 
and historical study of traditions of thought is a reminder of the contingent 
and fragile nature of what from time to time achieves the ontological status of 
undisputed reality or the normative status of good or evil. 
114 
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The point is that sound thinking requires a good tradition of thought to think 
with, and lasting traditions of thought require an institutional home to inhabit. 
The dependence of traditions of thought on institutions capable of hosting and 
fostering their partially self-referential and cumulative intergenerationality is 
not, however, a unidirectional phenomenon. Hosting institutions and hosted 
traditions of thought shape each other through complex processes determined 
by many factors. 
Hosting institutions depend as much on the traditions of thought that illu-
minate and give meaning and direction to their collective activity as traditions 
of thought depend on them. AB collective enterprises cemented by shared 
meaning, hosting institutions depend for their meaning and continuous vital-
ity on the hosted tradition of thought as much as the latter depends on the 
former for its intergenerational vitality. Durkheim's insight on the nature of 
society is equally true of any important institution: "(it] is not constituted sim-
ply by the mass of individuals who comprise it, the ground they occupy, the 
things they use, or the movements they make, but above all by the idea it has 
of itself' (Durkheim 1995: 4-25). Important institutions such as those of govern-
ment and the academy are particularly dependent on traditions of thought for 
the idea they have of themselves. It is from those traditions that instih1tions 
of government or learning derive the meaning and purpose of the "deontic 
powers" (Searle 2005) that they possess and distribute. In institutions of learn-
ing, deontic powers invest meaning in being a thinker and in thinking with a 
tradition. Without that meaning, few minds ever join the ranks that make high 
traditions of thought capacious, vibrant, and everlasting; and without that; it 
is ever more difficult for the rare great thinkers to emerge. 
The central factual claim of this chapter is that there exists a chain of 
dependency that runs from the high tradition oflegal thought to the conditions 
of possibility of justice and democracy in complex societies. This factual claim 
anchors the normative thesis that the legal academy ought to provide a better 
institutional home for the long and polyphonic (Kelly 1990; Schiavone 2011) 
tradition of legal thought that we have inherited. It ought to do so for four 
reasons connected to the factual claim about chain dependency. First, the 
tradition of legal thought depends on the institutions of the legal academy 
for the imaginative augmentation it needs in order to continue to illuminate 
the problems of self and society and to give meaning and direction to the 
legal academy. Second, the legal academy ought to provide a good home 
for the tradition of legal thought because the academy aspires to retain its 
cognitive point of view, its meaning, and its ability to help chart new horizons 
for self and society as the world changes. Should the legal academy persist in 
failing in this mission, the endurance of legal thought and the relevance of 
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the legal academy will continue to weaken. As the tradition of legal thought 
continues to be ignored and marginalized in the legal academy, as demands 
of simplification continue to be placed on legal thought, the intellectual and 
practical banalization oflegal education deepens. Third, the social institution 
of law itself depends on legal thought and the legal academy for its meaning 
and vitality, and for the cultivation of the agents who inhabit and operate 
the legal system. The fourth reason is that social integration, democratic self-
governance, and justice in complex societies depend on the social institution 
of law, which depends on legal education and legal thought. I will return 
below to this chain of dependency, which is traceable all the way back to the 
high tradition of legal thought. 
Anchored in hospitable institutions, modes of sustained inquiry are able to 
accumulate into intergenerational edifices of high thought, with open vistas, 
their thematic universe, normative aspirations, conceptual architecture, onto-
logical and causal complexes, and so on. When a tradition of thought has a 
good institutional abode, it does not stale. Confident and vibrant, the tradi-
tion of thought reaches out, engaging and making its own the contributions, 
themes, and methods of other traditions, while sharing with them in tum its 
own imaginative and cognitive powers. Internally, when well-hosted institu-
tionally, traditions of thought develop both a powerful ethos of constructive 
self-criticism and an ever-greater ambition for knowing, understanding, and 
imagining. In all this, institutions themselves are instilled with the force of 
thought. 
History confirms the dependence of high traditions of thought on academic 
institutions. Try to imagine, counterfactually, the setback for the possibility of 
a civilization concerned with both science and justice if the work of Aristotle 
had not found a home and creative successors in the medieval university. 
Imagine the ultimate fate of the ancient Greek sparkle of critical thinking -
and with it the dialectic between credo ut intelligan and intelligo ut credam 
in new Platonisms and Aristotelianisms - had it not been given a home in 
the medieval university from Abelard's prescholastic commitment to reason 
to the scholastic method of problem formulation, quaestio, disputatio, and 
determinatio. Imagine the development of Western, and ultimately global, 
law without the home that Roman law, codifications, and commentary found 
in the same medieval university (Berman 1983; Kelly 1990; Schiavone 2011; 
Weber 1978). Of course, all that seems distant to us, as the weight of the 
present and the pull of the future seem to compress the past into an opaque 
lump. It is worth remembering, though, that in the thirteenth century the 
scholastic Aquinas was a "bold thinker [who] also aroused the hostility of 
many colleagues and also a number of influential prelates. He was the kind of 
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attractive and controversial European intellectual who could not fail at once 
to illuminate and also to trouble intellectual and religious circles" (Le Goff 
2005: 131). 
More generally even, in large and small ways, individuals and cultures 
inhabit traditions of thought, both high and low, and walk daily on the paths 
they open. If this anthropological uni versa! needed proving, it should suffice to 
challenge the doubter to imagine self, society, and the world without using any 
of the constitutive blocks of the traditions of thought developed in the natural 
sciences, historiography, theology, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, the 
novel, and more, including the tradition of skepticism about the possibility of 
knowledge and understanding. 
1 LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Ultimately, the force of any tradition of thought will depend on internal and 
external forces. Internal to the tradition of thought, its longevity and vitality 
will depend on the reflective strength built into it. Externally, traditions of 
thought depend on tangible points of support in society and culture. 
Among traditions of thought, high legal thought stands out as carrying an 
enormous reflective potential as it provides a medium for thinking that opens 
to the mind vast, at once micro and macro, practical, cognitive and normative 
territories while sustaining a constructive commitment to self and society. In 
societies as complex as ours, high legal thought offers the best chances for our 
ability to critically understand roles and praxes and to prescribe changes to 
the institutional and cultural "formative contexts" that script those roles and 
praxes (Unger 2004) . 
I have pointed out the interdependence among traditions of legal thought, 
the institutions of the legal academy, democracy, and justice in complex soci-
eties. The stakes in this chain of interdependence are made higher by the fact 
that law is indeed the central institution of complex societies. "[I]f a society 
is subject to a legal system, then that system is the most important institution-
alized system to which it is subject. The law provides the general framework 
within which social life takes place" (Raz 199T 120-1). Put differently, "[w]e 
live in and by the law" (Dworkin 199T vii). To express the point with greater 
sociological rigor, the social institution oflaw constitutes the deepest and most 
expansive shared practice and meaning structure of social integration and 
reproduction in complex societies (Giddens 1986; Shapiro 2011). Considered 
in its ideational and agential aspects, "[l]aw is two things at once: a system of 
knowledge and a system of action" (Habermas 1999: 79). The accumulating 
knowledge and the cognitive point of view of the institution oflaw are created 
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from and as inventions in the traditions of legal thought. Correspondingly, 
the possibility of meaningful legal agency and of imposing normative mean-
ing on states of affairs present and future, that is, of the types of agency and 
situations collectively interpreted to have legal meaning and consequences, is 
also dependent on and conditioned by the high traditions oflegal thought and 
their lower, diluted operational versions. Law and legal thought reach into the 
future only because they reach from the past. Only when law and legal thought 
are able to bridge "immanent order and transcendent criticism" (Unger 1977: 
241) can complex societies be nested within law and unfold as stable and yet 
constantly changing normative endeavors in self-government and justice. 
With the height of the stakes properly understood, the question arises as to 
how good a host the legal academy currently is to the tradition of high legal 
thought. Any attentive observer would detect in the legal academy a deepening 
malady that marks its present and threatens its future: little of what goes on in it 
can be properly described as an education in legal thought; much of it is mere 
training, and the remainder is neither. The perils of this situation visit upon 
not only the institutional conditions of legal thought and the viability of legal 
education: there are also perils to the very social institution of law. With the 
social institution of law in peril, the conditions of possibility of self-governing 
social orders oriented toward justice are at risk (Perju 2010). 
This current state of legal education is unexpected when we consider four 
obvious facts . First, at no other time or place has legal education been better 
overall than it is today. Hence, this is no case for nostalgia . Second, high legal 
thought is not rocket science - it is harder. Consequently, legal education 
ought to be a seriously challenging, demanding, and exciting intellectual 
endeavor in legal thought. In other words, the institutions of the legal academy 
ought to host well the high traditions of legal thought. Third, legal education 
selects faculty and students from among some of the best intellectual and 
entrepreneurial talents. These are typically people holding lofty aspirations for 
themselves, their societies, and the world at large. Fourth, in legal academy, 
gifted and ambitious individuals encounter one of the best-funded fields of 
study in the history of universities. 
The combination of intellectual and entrepreneurial talent, lofty aspira-
tions, and resources should lead to extraordinary contributions to the universe 
of ideas and to solving the problems the world faces in delivering on the 
promises of knowledge, creativity, justice, respect, peace, and prosperity we 
continue to make each other. Yet, the institutions of legal education seem 
to proceed steadily down the path of merely providing mid-level technical 
training in an increasingly commodified academic environment that makes 
itself increasingly inhospitable to the traditions oflegal thought. 
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Developing a structural model for intergenerational high thought, R. 
Collins concludes that "[t]he most notable philosophers are not organizational 
isolates but members of chains of teachers and sh1dents who are themselves 
known philosophers, and/or of circles of significant contemporary intellectu-
als" (Collins 2000: 65). From the medieval university through the creation in 
the nineteenth century of the modern disciplines-based research universities 
to our disciplines-combining universities, any minimally complex tradition 
of thought has found a home in the institutions of the academy and given 
the academy its animating spirit. It is within legal academic institutions that 
chains connecting teachers and students and circles of legal thinkers are 
formed, giving their thought social currency over time. In this respect, today's 
legal academy is failing. 
In this environment, too many of the intellectual and entrepreneurial lions 
arriving yearly at the steps of the legal academy are routinely turned into 
intellectual and social lapdogs through a process that both legitimizes and 
rewards impoverished thinking about the law and timid engagement with the 
world's problems. Of course, there are exceptions everywhere, but the general 
malady of institutions of the legal academy a~ hosts for the tradition of legal 
thought is clear enough.to anyone giving it unbiased attention. What explains 
this ailment? What are its roots in legal thought itself? 
2 THE SITUATION OF LEGAL ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS 
The immediate cause of the malady of legal education and of the type of 
legal thinking it privileges is the prevailing structural bias of legal academy in 
favor of three symbiotic attitudes, which I label practicism, minimalism, and 
parochialism. 1 
Practicism is what an education that ought to cultivate a deep and wide foun-
dation for individual and collective achievement in any of the many professions 
in law degenerates into under conditions of minimalism and parochialism. 
Practicism is the view that the zones of intellechial, social, political, and eco-
nomic engagement through the law - such as government, the press, social 
movements, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, ser-
vices, business, management, industry, politics, cultural production, science 
and health, and law firms of all types - are best understood as mid-level tech-
nical domains, the relevant know-how for which rests in skillfully operating a 
relatively small set oflegal tools in the performance of tasks oflow to moderate 
complexity. 
1 From here on I borrow from Barrozo 20156. 
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Of course, a lot of legal work is precisely of that nature, and learning how 
to do it well is important. However, were technical training all there was to 
law, institutions granting one or two-year technical certificates might be better 
hosts for this type of instruction. 
Now, why would any law school develop a bias in favor of practicism? To 
understand why, we need to turn to the companion phenomena of minimalism 
and parochialism. 
Minimalism is what the ideal of high and diverse scholarly and profes-
sional aspiration in law degenerates into under the influence of practicism 
and parochialism. Minimalism is a multifold phenomenon. First and fore-
most, it has an intellectual aspect. In this first sense, minimalism is the view 
that the learning of - and what is to be learned in - law is reducible, first, to 
socialization into guild-member attitudes and jargon and, second, to learning 
rules, precedents, and technical notions, all mixed up with an often superfi-
cial form of cost-benefit analysis. It might be suggested that, psychologically, 
many would experience intellectual minimalism as reassuring: as offering an 
undemanding level of subject-matter mastery that allows those so trained to 
deploy lawyerly attitudes, language, and technique to arrive at smart answers 
to contained legal questions. 
However, intellectual minimalism is not the same as anti-intellectualism. 
_ The self-understanding of those who teach and study the law is that they 
are highly intellectually motivated and sharp. I agree. What distinguishes 
intellectual minimalism from anti-intellectualism is that the former views the 
world and the discourses that seek to make sense of and to engage with it 
as essentially simplifiable. For example, intellectual minimalism holds that 
the intellectual traditions we engage cannot possibly be significantly broader 
than what the twenty most popular authors have published over the past 
few decades. Fundamentally, intellectual minimalism considers optional the 
travails of the legal mind in mastering the traditions of thought it inhabits 
and in facing fully the complexities of the world. This analytical distinction 
made, observation shows that intellectual minimalism can easily twilight into 
anti-intellectualism and back again. 
Writing in 1834, the English translator of Friedrich Karl von Savigny's clearly 
written manifesto against the codification movement in Europe still felt the 
need preemptively to note in his Preface that "[a] modem English writer is 
expected to be so pellucidly clear, as almost to save his readers the exertion of 
thought" (Hayward 1986: v). I suspect that his observation was apt then and 
might be even more so today. Indeed, sometimes one hears echoed in the 
halls of legal academy the notion that writing must appear clear on effortless 
reading. This attitude has nothing to do with clarity: it is just a preference 
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for simplicity, rationalized as a demand for clarity. Of course, and to the 
extent that this is the case, the obsession with "clarity" stands to academic 
work as "straight talk" does to politics: a cover for intellectual under-effort and 
unwarranted simplification of complex matters. 
In a second sense, minimalism appears as professional minimalism. In 
this case, minimalism is the view that the archetypical professional setting 
for the use of what one ordinarily learns in legal academy is the corporate 
law firm. Clearly, professional minimalism overestimates the importance of 
the corporate law firm with respect to the overall number of law graduates 
employed by firms and the social impact of those firms. More importantly, 
though, professional minimalism underestimates, with enormous individual 
and social costs, all the many other settings oflegal professional engagement. 
Unless resisted, intellectual and professional minimalism end up inviting 
a hedonistic approach to legal educatio~, allowing too many to evade the 
exertion of profound learning and to numb the natural anxieties caused by 
seeing the world as a vast territory for the agency that true legal education 
cultivates and empowers. The hedonism in question, if one there were, would, 
in J. S. Mill's terms, not be one of the highest order. 
Minimalism begets practicism, and practicism legitimizes minimalism. 
Again, it challenges the imagination to envision minimalism and practicism 
as having the strength to bend the spine oflegal education. Except that to their 
assistance comes parochialism. 
Parochialism in legal education is what healthy cultural self-confidence 
degenerates into, especially in environments plagued by practicism and min-
imalism. Parochialism is of two types: parochialism of space and parochialism 
of time. What unifies the two types is shrinkage. In parochialism, the geograph-
ical, historical, institutional, practical, and intellectual dimensions of law are 
all imagined to be smaller than they actually are. 
For an example of parochialism of space, turn to the United States where, in 
the middle of the twentieth century, the country and allies emerged victorious 
from World War II. In the aftermath of the war, the United States experienced 
a renewed sense of cultural self-confidence. American culture and influence 
traveled the world, riding on a wealth of military, economic, and geopolitical 
power. Domestically, the elected branches of government seemed too often 
unable to provide moral leadership sufficient to address and resolve injustices, 
old or new, in American society. In that conjuncture, the Supreme Court 
took the lead in addressing some important national questions and precipi-
tating reforms. With that, the prestige of the Supreme Court increased, and, 
accordingly, the federal, especially of course in the Supreme Court, appellate 
clerkship came to be seen as the high watermark of accomplishment for law 
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graduates aspiring to a place in legal academe. In a legal culture already his-
torically committed to case-law analysis and commentary, the rise in prestige 
of the federal judiciary brought with it the cult of personality of judges in gen-
eral and of Supreme Court justices in particular. Fast-forward a few decades, 
and a significant portion oflegal scholarship, commentary, and curriculum in 
the United States is centered - sometimes with intellectual sophistication and 
practical relevance - on the country's appellate decisions on matters of domes-
tic law and on the personalities and bench trajectories of appellate decision 
makers. In all this, practicism and minimalism meet parochialism of space. 
Every political organization should hope to educate a fraction of its members 
to engage in an aspirationally endless legal dialogue about the foundation 
and unfolding of the organization. I consider constitutional commentary in 
the United States to be a fine example of such dialogue, contributing to 
social cohesion and cultural reproduction over time. In my view, this dialogue 
should remain unburdened by expectations of higher knowledge, insight, 
<:1nd imagination. I argue only that such types of domesticated dialogue would 
benefit from enlarging their analytical and discursive capabilities. The best way 
to achieve that enlargement is to subject future participants of the dialogue to 
the sh1dy of the traditions of high legal thought from which the diluted ideas 
they will one day deploy originally come. 
For an example of parochialism of time, tum to the kind of diet compara-
tivism and internationalism increasingly common in legal education around 
the world. The general outlook of parochialism of time is that unique and 
amazing transformations mark our time, and that it has become inconsequen-
tial to think about law and inexpedient to practice it outside the global legal 
melting pot engulfing us from all sides thanks to those transformations. All 
of that seems true. However, parochialism of time preaches that the thing 
to do in this context is to become conversant with law everywhere, usually 
through the expedient of sacrificing depth ofknowledge oflegal thought any-
where. To assist in the enterprise, the posture I describe holds that we need 
legal education around the world to cluster around recent best practices. With 
time-parochialism usually comes the belief that hardly anything written about 
law before the current wave of globalization has any real relevance. In all 
this, there is a radical presentism, a true parochialism of time. This brand of 
parochialism enters the world as global and cosmopolitan, but inhabits it as 
practicism and minimalism gone global. 
You may well be thinking that parochialism of space and parochialism 
of time, as described here, are mutually exclusive. They would be, except, 
first, where one's parochialism of space happens to make land where some 
of what is considered best legal practices are thought to come from and, 
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second, where parochialism of time is the prevalent type of comparativism 
and internationalism. 
Today practicism, minimalism, and parochialism reign almost unchal-
lenged in legal academic institutions, where their impact is felt everywhere. 
Here are just two examples of that impact. 
3 FIRST EXAMPLE 
The academic study of law carries a double invitation. The first is to join an 
extraordinary intellectual tradition with ancient roots; the second, to engage 
professionally in one of the many zones of legal intellectual, social, political, 
and economic activities. However, students entering the legal academy in the 
twenty-first century have come to believe, as a result of the structural bias in 
legal education in favor of practicism, minimalism, and parochialism, that the 
academic study of law is about being trained for tasks, thus accepting only a 
reductionist version of the second invitation. The same institutional bias leads 
some faculty to believe, in all good faith, that intellectual minimalism with 
respect to their own scholarly projects and the practicism of coaching students 
into professional minimalism constitute their primary responsibilities. Despite 
this troubling understanding of the nature of legal education, until recently 
many labored under tl1e illusion tl1at all was well. (Maybe they are already 
getting back into the illusion?) 
Using the United States once again as an example, while only a portion of 
those graduating from national law schools would end up in medium to large 
corporate law firms, many more seemed to derive deep psychological comfort 
from the belief that they all could, if only they wished, become participants 
in the obviously important provision of legal services to corporations. In this 
environment, law schools' career services understandably seemed primarily 
invested in their role as intermediaries between a fraction of their students and 
the corporate law firm. 
That state of bliss came to a halt in the United States around 2009-10, 
when changes to the employment structure of corporate law firms following 
the global financial crisis laid bare the flimsiness of one of the foundations 
on which the state of bliss had rested. Simultaneously, many law students 
interpret the high cost of tuition as one of the signs that tl1ey were indeed 
purchasing a type of service: legal training of the moderately challenging and 
somewhat entertaining type leading to bar eligibility certification and law firm 
placement. Shell-shocked b)( changes in the law firm employment picture, 
legal academy reacted by furtl1er validating the notion that legal education 
was a sector of the services market, and that law students and law firms were 
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clients on the two ends of the brokerage services they were in the market to 
sell. But now the customers were unhappy, forcing legal academy to compete 
in divining what would make their clients happy again. 
In that employment context, and amid the general ongoing infantilization 
of higher education, many law faculty seemed to dig the educational hole 
deeper, seeking more than ever before to reassure customer-students of their 
practice readiness. Should they pose any serious intellectual challenge to 
students, legal academics seemed prepared to show contrition and to rectify 
matters, often feeling vulnerable to negative customer satisfaction reviews. 
Now, the point is that none of these recent developments, financial crisis 
or not, would seem even imaginable were it not for the grip of practicism, 
minimalism, and parochialism on legal education. 
4 SECOND EXAMPLE 
We find another debilitating consequence of the impact of practicism, mini-
malism, and parochialism in legal education in the way it reacts to law school 
rankings and to the curricular and pedagogical interventions oflawyers' guilds 
and other bar regulators around the world. 
Indeed, the attention and cooperation that the institutions of the legal 
academy extend to the rankings created by business media is puzzling. Equally 
puzzling is that the legal academy continues to surrender their curricular and 
pedagogical autonomy to venerable - and yet external and often limited by 
the interests they represent- institutional actors who have historically claimed 
the prerogative to accredit or recommend legal academic institutions and to 
set educational bar eligibility criteria. 
In the current context, media rankings and bar regulators are instruments of 
practicism, minimalism, and parochialism in legal education. Of course, the 
legal academy tends to rationalize its prostration before both. In the United 
States, the rationalization typically rests on a series of interlocking fallacies . 
One can start anywhere.in the chain of fallacies in order to unravel it. Here is 
one way to do it in relation to the rankings. First, the legal academy convinces 
itself by the persuasive force of endless repetition that law firms are dissat-
isfied with the training the legal academy offers their students. Second, the 
institutions of the legal academy conclude that as a consequence, they should 
import into the law curriculum the job training law firms are no longer willing 
to provide (often for jobs they no longer offer). Third, the legal academy works 
to convince their students that they ought to _be "practice ready." However, 
coaching for practice readiness is expensive and is ideally inflicted on stu-
dents who are easily trainable. Fourth; attracting public and private funds and 
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enrolling easily trainable students are the first and most important tasks on 
which all else depends. Last, the attraction of funds and trainability potential 
is predicated on doing well in the rankings, which metrics track trainability 
and resources. Again, all this would be just another implausible tale were it not 
for the fact that the institutions of the legal academy are already contaminated 
by practidsm, minimalism, and parochialism. 
5 INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE MALADY OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY: 
RATIO-HISTORICISM, PRAGMATISM, AND ANTI-FORMALISM 
Different parts of the world follow their own paths in making the institutions 
of the legal academy inhospitable to high legal thought. One element they all 
seem to share, though, is the growing influence of the model oflegal education 
prevalent in the United States. With this model travels a particular juridical 
ratio-historicist alliance that emerged in nineteenth-century European legal 
thought and the version of pragmatism as a worldview and attitude type con-
solidated in nineteenth- and twentieth-century American jurisprudence and 
philosophy. It is to those changes in the history of ideas that one must tum, 
even if briefly, to start to understand the historical roots of the vulnerability 
of - first, American, and now, global - legal education to biases in favor of 
practicism, minimalism, and parochialism. 
Ratio-historicism.The first transnational political masses belong to the nine-
teenth century. Those masses saw social, economic, and military problems as 
the product of human agency and choice, and therefore as essentially political 
problems. (From here on I borrow from Barraza 2015a; for different aspects 
see also Arendt 1998 and 2006; Donzelot 1994; Sperber 1994 Tomlins 2010.) 
Urban and rural workers on both sides of the Atlantic embraced class iden-
tities, adopted shared diagnoses of their predicament, and developed a new 
confidence in their collective power to solve their problems through institu-
tionalized and noninstitutionalized politics. This newly discovered class con-
sciousness was founded on a sense of shared destiny and the denaturalization 
of immiseration and oppression. One would be ill advised to underestimate 
the novelty of interpreting personal and collective vulnerability as products 
of human will - a will that could be galvanized, owned, transformed, and 
ultimately deployed in favor of the downtrodden. Workers and many intel-
lectuals believed that destiny was in their hands and history at last on their 
side. 
With their entrance onto the political stage, nineteenth-century transna-
tional political masses denounced and often violently challenged the Restora-
tion and post-Restoration constitutional settlements of Western nation-states 
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and subnational political units. Simultaneously, economic, military, and social 
crises continued everywhere to weaken further the perception of the stabil-
ity of social orders in the eyes of the populace as well as of the ruling and 
intellectual elites. In that context, those elites could not help but feel that 
they were standing on the precipice of social chaos, a predicament for which 
they blamed an unbridled and uncultivated popular will. To the waves of 
democratic expansion, social unrest, political revolutions, economic debacle, 
geopolitical uncertainty, and war, ruling and intellectual elites of the Victorian 
Age responded with a deep and sweeping new approach to law and politics. 
They responded with what I term The Great Alliance among historicism, 
rationalism, and popular will. 
Law always dwells in the space where history, reason, and will meet, with 
each age celebrating its own particular paradigmatic alliance between them. 
Will in democratic times means popular will. But in the past, it meant divine 
will, the ruler's will, and so on. In contemporary legal doctrine, will is expressed 
as deference to democracy, to the elected branches of government, to public 
opinion, to evolving cultural standards, to trends in legislative production, to 
social movements, to current common knowledge, etc. History stands for his-
torical events as they inform the law (such as war as justification for extreme 
measures), historical tradition (such as legal precedents or, more broadly, 
legal/political/moral traditions), and historical meaning (such as the original 
as· opposed to the contemporary meaning of constitutions, etc.). In legal doc-
trine, history appears as a form of argument that appeals to the past as a basis 
for regulation of the present and the future . Reason includes instrumental 
reason ( concern with consequences, expediency, cost-benefit analysis), cogni-
tive reason (science, expertise), and idealist reason (revelation of the true or 
better meaning and legitimate forms of legal values such as freedom, equal-
ity, predictability, justice, and dignity) . In legal doctrine, reason appears as a 
form of argument that appeals to the faculty of reason to chart directions of 
development for the law. 
The Great Alliance is just the current paradigm for how history, reason, and 
will come together in and as law. And it has turned out to be an extraordinarily 
adaptive, resilient, and attractive settlement process in the form of an intellec-
tually and legally authoritative cognitive-normative-practical vision oflaw and 
society. In its most general terms, the nineteenth-century rapprochement of 
legal rationalism and historicism after their relative polarization in the after-
math of the American and French revolutions started in the first half of the 
nineteenth century and assumed features attractive simultaneously to com-
mon prudential understandings and to the legal thought of the time. During 
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that formative period, rationalism became increasingly committed to inherited 
legal frameworks and values as manifestations of reason's cunning operation 
in the world (Hegel 2003). As consequence, improvised, highly contextual 
constitutional arrangements were enshrined as ontologically essential by ratio-
nality, given the way reason is supposed to operate from within processes of 
social evolution. Moving from the opposite camp, historicism appealed to 
the rationalizations of legal reasoning qua legal science in order to conceptu-
ally tame, systematize, and bestow endurance-cum-adaptability on historically 
and organically generated materials, leading in the first moment to a formalist 
jurisprudence of concepts and later to all sorts of social stasis processes (Savi-
gny 1986). However, even more consequential was that the will of the masses 
acceded to this ratio-historicist rapprochement. Indeed, the transnational polit-
ical masses bought, especially in the North Atlantic nations, into versions of 
constitutional veneration able to connect national lore while seeming not to 
require too great of an intellectual sacrifice. That modern ratio-historicist set-
tlement tamed the will of the masses under the influence of authoritative legal 
thought, conceptions of political morality (including the notion of rights), and 
a general sense of social evolution. To miss this last piece of the sociological 
and philosophical puzzle of modem law is to be condemned to see only a 
distorted and partial image of its making. The Great Alliance in law among 
reason, history, and the political will of the masses in the nineteenth century 
has provided ever since the conceptual as well as the ideological conditions 
for the many ups and downs in the history oflegal positivism, pragmatism, and 
reflective equilibrium idealisms. 
That all these traditions of twentieth-century legal thought declared war 
against classical legal thought - as the first generation of The Great Alliance 
jurisprudence is now known (Kennedy 1975) - should not distract us. The 
hard reality is that under The Great Alliance legal rationalism now survives as 
punctuated reformism, as consequentialism, and as a norm of performative 
critical discourse; and legal historicism survives as traditionalism, intellectual 
parochialism, and the precautionary prudence of cost-benefit balancing. 
It is difficult to imagine how the institutions of the legal academy would have 
become inhospitable to the tradition oflegal thought had they not been shaped 
in significant part by the success of The Great Alliance, which authoritatively 
decreed that the heavy intellectual lifting of the tradition oflegal thought had 
reached a comfortable plateau. 
Pragmatism is a fruitful philosophical school that emerged - influenced 
by preexisting undercurrents in European philosophy - in the industrializing 
and urbanizing United States of the nineteenth century. In very general terms, 
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pragmatism, at both the explanatory and the normative levels, takes a func-
tionalist approach to epistemology and a consequentialist approach to action 
orientation, at the end connecting both. Also fruitful in its own way, legal 
realism is a school of legal thought that, although not native to the United 
States, encountered there a reception unlike anywhere else in the world, due 
in part to the way pragmatism had prepared the terrain for it. Equally in general 
terms, legal realism takes a functionalist approach to legal epistemology and a 
consequentialist approach to legal agency (Schlegel 2011). These two schools 
of thought were closely related in the works, for example, of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. (Wells 1988), and are now mainstream in American legal culture, 
including in law schools (Desautels-Stein 2014b). 
There exists in original philosophical pragmatism and legal realism a great 
ambition of the mind, but that aspect of those schools of thought was not main-
streamed in contemporary American law schools and across the world, despite 
the example of several of their proponents. What came to prevail was a reduc-
tionist functionalist approach to knowledge, practice, and policy. Writing in 
the 1830s about the "philosophic method of the Americans," Alexis de Toc-
queville perceptively speculated that "there is no country in the civilized world 
where they are less occupied with philosophy than the United States . .. To 
escape from the spirit of system, from the yokes of habits, from family maxims, 
from class opinions, and, up to a certain point, from national prejudices; to 
take tradition only as information, and current facts only as a useful study for 
doing otherwise and better; to seek the reason for things by themselves and in 
themselves alone, to strive for a result without letting themselves be chained 
to the means, and to see through the form to the foundation: these are the 
principal features that characterize what I shall call the philosophic method 
of the Americans" (Tocqueville 2000: 403). 
Tocqueville's account of the defining feature of the American mind is far 
from complete, and it was not entirely accurate even for the nineteenth cen-
tury. However, it does seem to caphue something important about the fertility 
of American soil for pragmatism and legal realism. Tocqueville, I venture, 
speculating myself, would not be surprised by the functionalist orientation 
that would in our own time render American law schools vulnerable to the 
hold of practicism, minimalism, and parochialism. In any event, that "philo-
sophic method" is now in the process of becoming universal as philosophical 
and attitudinal pragmatism. 
To clarify, pragmatism and legal realism offer cognitive and practical 
insights that ought to be welcome among the intellectual and practical con-
cerns of jurists and lawyers everywhere. However, when a diluted functionalist 
orientation becomes sovereign, it sabotages education and thought. This is 
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not the place to elaborate further on the matter, but once law is defined as 
a means to an end and legal thinking is measured against the benchmark of 
parochialisms of time and space and of expediency, and the tradition of legal 
thought is considered valuable only to the extent that it provides pret-a.-porter 
or fragments for improvised solutions to real or perceived problems, the con-
ditions of the understanding of which are left untouched by reflection, then 
the tradition of thought is conceived as an ( optional and fragmentary) intel-
lectual Band-Aid. Fragmentation of the intellectual tradition tends to lead to 
fragmented thinking. 
Once again, observers would be hard pressed to imagine how the insti-
tutions of the legal academy have become inhospitable to the tradition of 
legal thought had they not been shaped in part by philosophical pragmatism 
and the version of pragmatism found in legal realism. Misunderstood in all this 
is the dependency of legal realism on The Great Alliance, and nowhere else is 
that misunderstanding more at display than in the confused anti-formalism of 
legal realism. 
Confused anti-formalism completes the circle of influences that render the 
institutions of legal education ill equipped to provide in full the institutional 
conditions for high legal thought. 
Modern law dwells - sometimes thriving, sometimes languishing - in the 
tensions between the facts of functional adaptability and the normativity 
of structural integrity oriented toward justice; between efficacy and valid-
ity; between materialism and idealism. Considerable intellectual energy has 
focused on the development of a general theory of this tension from vari-
ous perspectives (Barrozo 2015a; Bobbio 204; Brunkhorst 204; Dworkin 1997; 
Foucault 1995; Fried 1980; Habermas 1999; Hegel 2003; Koskenniemi 2007; 
Luhmann 2004; Rawls 1999; Unger 1977; Weber 1978). This tension is some-
times denied, but more often addressed by one-sided privileging of functional 
materialism or normative idealism. Thus, from about the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury to the beginning of the twentieth century, ideal concerns for the structural 
integrity and validity criteria of law were deemed to trump material consid-
erations of expediency. However, those ideal concerns soon succumbed to a 
type oflegal formalism (Desautels-Stein 2014a; Hart 1997; Kant 1999 and 2006; 
Kelsen 1967; Kennedy 1973; Raz 1980; Schauer 1988; Schlag 1991; Stone 2004; 
Summers 2009; Unger 1986; de! Vecchio 1921; Weber 1978; Weinrib 1995) that 
saw in the historicity of customary norms, in the manifestation of states' will 
through posited rules, and in the rational aspiration of an internally coherent 
and gapless system of concepts that turned those norms and rules into a sys-
tem of law the best way to regulate internally as well as externally the will of 
states. 
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Those norms and rules and the conceptual systems that organized them 
enjoyed the intellectual and political prestige reserved to ratio-historicist 
achievements such as that of The Great Alliance, for they were considered 
to have both passed the test of time and met the demands of reason and 
the requirements of state or citizenry consent. More often than not, this 
type of legal formalism degenerated into formulaic legal analysis and atti-
tudes, or what I call formulaic formalism to distinguish it from constructive 
formalism. 
Starting in earnest by the end of the nineteenth century, formulaic formal-
ism came under relentless criticism by legal realism, with each generation of 
jurists ever since aiming to surpass the previous one in anti-formalist creden-
tials. Failing to comprehend the varieties of formalism and the essentiality to 
law of constructive formalism, anti-formalists fell into the arms of functional 
materialism. Rather than as a symphonic institution, law was approached as a 
jazzy patchwork. 
However, overriding concerns with functional adaptability and efficacy 
exact an intellectual price no smaller than that exacted by the formulaic 
formalism it criticized, and with time it too came to degenerate into its own 
subtypes of formulaic formalism. In other words, one-sided critics of formalism 
accomplished no more than replacing one kind of forrnulaic formalism with 
another, from the ideal to the material. In any event, as the result of both histor-
ical catastrophes and a sense of intellectual plateauing, after World War II the 
earlier type of formulaic formalism - that centered on norms, rules, and their 
organizing conceptual system - started to recover some space in legal thought 
along with a revival of natural law. Enough so that many jurists came once 
again to experience the tension between functional materialism and normative 
idealism as an inescapable choice between the functionalism of cost-benefit 
policy analysis and the normativity of formulaic formalism. In other words, 
the tension was between stripped-clown versions of functional adaptability and 
structural integrity. And to choose the old formalism of norms, rules, and 
conceptual edifices over the relatively more recent one of cost-benefit policy 
analysis again became somewhat acceptable. 
The ideological alignment of preferences for one side or the other of the 
tension varies from context to context, its volatility closely tracking the intel-
lectual limitations of both sides. To settle for either is of course a theoretical 
and practical mistake. We may well recognize the inherent tension in law 
between functional needs and ideal aspirations, and yet refuse the terms of the 
prevailing reductionist version of the tension. But that is not what happened 
in contemporary legal thought and in the institutions of the legal academy. 
Institutional constraints and biases - such as practicism, minimalism, and 
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parochialism - favor increasingly reductionist and one-sided versions of legal 
thought, including of the tensions that inhere in law. 
6 FOUR PROPOSALS TO MAKE THE LEGAL ACADEMY INCREASINGLY 
HOSPITABLE TO LEGAL THOUGHT 
The picture I draw of the current state of the institutions of the legal academy as 
hosts of the tradition of legal thought is obviously incomplete and highlights 
only some of its most striking aspects. Nevertheless, even this incomplete 
account raises the question of what to do? 
If the legal academy is to earn a future for itself, it must expunge from its insti-
httional design and culture the bias in favor of practicism, minimalism, and 
parochialism. Unless and until that is accomplished, the legal academy will 
continue to fail their societies and the world, the talent they bring together, the 
resources they command, the tradition of thought they have the fiduciary duty 
to critically cultivate and expand, and the full range of the professions in law. 
Because history is not necessarily fate, I turn briefly to some of the initial steps 
that might help the institutions of the legal academy get up off their knees 
and stand tall to face their responsibilities to thought, the professions, and 
society. The proposals run from the relatively modest and not too difficult for 
an individual institution to implement to the more ambitious and dependent 
on collective action on the part of the legal academy and their associations 
such as the American Association of Law Schools in the United States. 
First Proposal 
Rankings may be informative, and in the age of indicators they appear to 
be irresistible. Obfuscated along the way is the fact that in the long term, 
indicators are more constitutive than descriptive of that which they measure. 
Bearing both facts in mind, institutions of the legal academy should create 
and endow foundations at the national, regional, and international levels to 
review and rank them nationally and internationally according to standards 
specifically designed to capture the quality of their contributions both to the 
grand tradition oflegal thought and to the many professions in law. Call this 
the Legal Education Peer Quality Assessment. 
To the extent that resistance to the existing business of rankings pre.sents a 
problem of collective action to the institutions of the legal academy, the most 
prestigious institutions in each country and the associations of law schools 
should take the lead, as they have an obvious special responsibility to launch 
and sustain this initiative. 
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Second Proposal 
The legal academy ought to constitute both the institutional home for legal 
thought and the premier place for the education of those seeking to enter 
one of the many professions in law. For this reason, legal academy should 
reexamine their cooperation with the existing law school accreditation model 
and with the regulatory systems of bar admissions. 
Around the world, and for almost a century now in the United States, the 
professional association oflawyers and students, the bar associations, condition 
their approval or recommendation of legal academic institutions on their 
meeting certain standards. Such standards continue to evolve over time and 
currently run the gamut from the structure of the careers of law teachers to 
what goes on in the curriculum and pedagogy oflaw courses. 
Though well-intended, the influence of the bar has largely contributed 
to the commodification, banalization, and reductionism of legal education 
while illustrating the unemancipated status of legal academic institutions. 
Such incursions on academic autonomy have thus far had the effect of push-
ing further into legal education the agendas of practicism, minimalism, and 
parochialism, for they come from limited perspectives of external actors whose 
partial responsibilities do not sufficiently overlap with the broader responsibil-
ities of the legal academy. 
What is needed here, as elsewhere in legal education, is a good dose of 
institutional pride, gravitas, and understanding on the part of the legal academy 
of its broad responsibilities, without which law schools will find no impetus 
to change their current unemancipated circumstance. The institutions of tl1e 
legal academy should therefore establish clear limits to the influence of the bar. 
Once emancipated from its current capitis diminutio, the legal academy would 
gain the ability to develop autonomous and fruitful cooperative relationships 
witl1 professional guilds and regulators of access to professions, including the 
bar in each country. 
Third Proposal 
The institutions of the legal academy everywhere should create a required 
yearlong course on legal thought. Call this the Foundations of Legal Thought 
course. The talented and ambitious minds arriving every year at the legal 
academy ought to be offered an opportunity to engage critically with the 
tradition of legal thought. Wide adoption of Foundations of Legal Thought 
would likely send tectonic signals throughout legal education around the 
world, and this may well be the most important initiative to start immunizing 
faculty and new generations of students against legal education's structural 
bias in favor of practicism, minimalism, and parochialism. 
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Naturally, schools and scholars would adopt different conceptions of Foun-
dations of Legal Thought. For example, some may emphasize canonical works 
selected from the ages and places oflegal thought, while others may focus on 
groundbreaking contemporary works from around the wor1d. The important 
task to keep in mind is to connect students to intellectual greatness in law. 
The study of traditional doctrinal content as well as guided role-playing 
activities - whether actual or simulated - are essential components of a good 
legal education, one that respects distinct learning styles and cultivates a range 
of capacities while often serving underserved individuals and groups. Those 
components of legal education will continue to constitute the large majority 
of requirements for first-level law degrees (the LL.B., the J.D.). However, just 
imagine the possibilities for those components of legal education once they 
are taken out of the shadow of practicism, minimalism, and parochialism, 
and once the students who come to them have had their knowledge and 
educational agency deepened and broadened by a year spent with intellectual 
greatness in law. There are good reasons to expect that many prospective law 
students, likely the strongest among them, would be appreciative of the legal 
academy's unwillingness to deny a home for the traditions oflegal thought. 
Fourth Proposal 
Feasible as the three first proposals are, the prevailing bias in favor of practi-
cism, minimalism, and parochialism may already have created habits of mind 
too tenacious to dislodge in the short term and, concomitantly, may have too 
severely undermined the sense of possibility in legal education. Furthermore, 
basic law degree programs will, in the immediate future, continue to operate 
under constraints that limit their role in the critical study and expansion of the 
tradition oflegal thought. How to react to such difficulties? 
One answer is that legal academy should turn, as almost every other depart-
ment of the modern research university does, to doctorates as aspirational insti-
tutional islands of scholarly ambition and excellence. These programs should 
look for prospective doctoral students without regard to the place or language 
of their initial legal education, tapping into global pools of talent. Again, as 
almost every other department of the modem research university does. These 
new doctoral programs in law should hold their students accountable for gain-
ing a critical understanding oflegal thought in general and for mastering the 
legal-thought foundations of their particular fields. Doctoral students should 
understand that whatever else the doctorate is about and wherever they will 
employ their learning, they constitute the next generation of the critical and 
inventive keepers of a long tradition of thinking about society and self in the 
grand and sophisticated ways of legal thought. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The central factual claim of this chapter is the interdependence of high tradi-
tion oflegal thought, the institutions of the legal academy, the social institution . 
oflaw, and social integration with normative self-governance oriented toward 
justice. This claim supports the normative thesis that the legal academy ought 
to provide an institutional home for the long and polyphonic tradition oflegal 
thought. The institutions of the legal academy, I argued, fail in that responsibil-
ity. Aspects of the design and culture of the institutions of the legal academy 
that contribute to its inhospitality to high legal thought were explained. I 
named those aspects practicism, minimalism, and parochialism. 
Legal thought and legal academic institutions shape each other, thus rais-
ing the question of what elements of the tradition oflegal thought have made 
the institutions of the legal academy in the United States and around the 
. world increasingly vulnerable to practicism, minimalism, and parochialism. 
Gesturing toward an answer to this question, this chapter turned to the ratio-
historicism of The Great Alliance, to the intellectual impatience and reduc-
tionism of philosophical pragmatism and legal realism, and to confused anti-
formalism. The chapter last turned to four proposals for beginning to make 
the institutions of the legal academy hospitable to the high traditions of legal 
thought. 
This chapter did not advance a model of legal thought to shape the insti-
tutions of legal education away from its current predicament. It is not that 
attractive models do not already exist. The problem is that they will not have 
an opportunity to influence the institutions of the legal academy until these 
are made even a little more hospitable to complex, demanding, high intel-
lectual endeavors. It is good, though, to know where to head, for "no wind," 
Montaigne reminds us, "serves him who addresses his voyage to no certain 
port." 
As individuals, we live between past and future, tradition and will, remem-
brance and hope, beginning and end. And so do our societies. For individuals 
and societies, the present is a very solitary place and the future arid and opaque 
without traditions of thought for company. 
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